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“(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1): (a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation...

“(3) Harassment shall be deemed to be a form of discrimination within the meaning of paragraph (1), when unwanted conduct related to any of the grounds referred to in article 1 takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment...”

Article 3 provides: “(1) ... this Directive shall apply to all persons ... in relation to: ... (c) employment and working conditions...”

In its judgment the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held:

It did not follow from articles 1, 2(1), 2(2)(a) or 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78 that the principle of equal treatment which it was designed to safeguard was limited to people who themselves had a disability within the meaning of the directive.

On the contrary, the purpose of the directive, as regarded employment and occupation, was to combat all forms of discrimination on the ground of disability.

The principle of equal treatment enshrined in the directive in that area applied not to a particular category of person but by reference to Where it was established that an employee in a situation such as that in the present case suffered direct discrimination on grounds of disability, an interpretation of Directive 2000/78 limiting its application only to people who were themselves disabled was liable to deprive the directive of an important element of its effectiveness and to reduce the protection which it was intended to guarantee.

Since article 2(3) deemed harassment to be a form of discrimination within article 2(1), the directive was similarly not limited to the prohibition of harassment of people who were themselves disabled.

On those and further grounds, the Court ruled:

1 Directive 2000/78, and, in particular, articles 1 and 2(1) and (2)(a) thereof, were to be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by those provisions was not limited only to people who were themselves disabled.

Where an employer treated an employee who was not himself disabled less favourably than another employee was, had been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and it was established that the less favourable treatment of that employee was based on the disability of his child, whose care was provided primarily by that employee, such treatment was contrary to the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by article 2(2)(a).

2 The directive, and in particular articles 1 and 2(1) and (3), were to be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition of harassment laid down by those provisions was not limited only to people who were themselves disabled.

Where it was established that the unwanted conduct amounting to harassment which was suffered by an employee who was not himself disabled was related to the disability of his child, whose care was provided primarily by that employee, such conduct was contrary to the prohibition of harassment laid down by article 2(3).

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