Privy Council
Published August 3, 2007
Gibson v Government of the United States of America

The principle of stare decisis was not absolute and the Privy Council could exercise its power to depart from precedent if it concluded that one of its own previous decisions was incorrect.

The Privy Council (Lord Woolf, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Hey-wood and Sir Christopher Rose; Lord Hoffmann, Lord Carswell and Lord Mance dissenting) on July 23, 2007, allowed an appeal by Lemuel Gibson from the Court of Appeal of the Bahamas (President Sawyer, Justice of Appeal Churaman and Justice of Appeal Ibrahim) which held, on January 22, 2003, that it had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by the Superintendent of Bahama Prison and the Government of the United States of America, from Mr Justice Isaacs who, on February 5, 2002, granted writs of habeas corpus in respect of Mr Gibson and two other applicants who had been committed to custody to await extradition to the USA.

On February 2004, the Privy Council, by a majority of three to two upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in respect of those two other applicants: see Cartwright v Superintendent of HM Prison ([2004] 1 WLR 902).

LORD BROWN said that each of the seven members of the Board as presently constituted was of the clear view that the minority opinion in Cartwright was correct.

Stare decisis was an important principle for certainty and finality. But the principle was not absolute. Their Lordships’ task was to ensure justice according to law.

According to law, the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain the USA’s appeal, however meritorious that appeal was. The Board should not now shrink from saying so.

LORD HOFFMANN said that the decision of the majority would encourage attempts to revisit cases decided by a narrow majority.

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