There have been many cases in recent years involving celebrities and the extent of their rights to privacy. But what about privacy for vulnerable people who were never celebrities in the first place? Is their protection against press intrusion stronger or weaker than the famous? Is the situation exacerbated by the fact that the subject of prurient interest happens to be a child?

Two very recent cases dealt with these knotty issues. The first involved a child involved in a difficult adoption. A proposed BBC programme portrayed the process and included footage of a number of intimate matters, including the last contact session between mother and daughter, which was tearful and distressing. It also included a scene that gave the impression to viewers that the mother was sometimes rough with her daughter and had problems with anger management. The situation was made all the more sensitive by the fact that she was a vulnerable adult with learning difficulties.

The second case involved a young girl now aged nearly six, who was in foster care, also with a view to adoption. Her background was traumatic. While she was living with her birth mother, her younger brother had died; less than months later, her older sister, aged just under four, also died in suspicious circumstances. The child was taken into foster care. In a fact-finding hearing in relation to the death of her older sister, a judge had found on the civil standard of proof, not as part of criminal proceedings — that her mother had caused the death of the older girl through physical ill-treatment. A coroner’s inquest was to be held into the death of the elder sister and the press were interested in reporting this.

In both cases, the court had to perform what has been described as the "ultimate balancing exercise" as to whether in these circumstances an individual’s right to privacy, should, or should not, take priority over the freedom of the press. The latter right was described as a particularly strong one, even though it carried no extra weight when balanced against the right to privacy.

When there is talk of opening up the family courts to public scrutiny, the one big fear that the courts have is that any identification of a child or vulnerable parent may have a damaging effect on those very people the courts are sworn to protect. All the good work done for their benefit could be easily undone by such identification.

It may, therefore, come as no surprise to find that the courts decided in both cases that steps should be taken to prevent the children being identified. In the BBC case, the court also protected the vulnerable mother by a similar order. However, the parents of the dead child in the coroner’s case were not so fortunate – the court ruled that they could be identified.

What does one learn from this? Freedom of speech, guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a valuable right that should only be infringed in exceptional circumstances. But the right to a family life free from public scrutiny, enshrined in the same convention, is no less important, especially when children and the vulnerable are involved.

Stephen Gerlis is a district judge at Barnet County Court and chairman of the London Association of District Judges

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