What does the law say in the case of someone who secretly puts alcohol in the
drink of a person who then goes on to drive. Such a prank or plot is, of
course, dangerous and potentially lethal. This case was an
Attorney-General’s Reference, a procedure by which the appeal court can rule
on a point of law that the Attorney-General wants clarified. The Court of
Appeal was asked to consider the position of an accused who had
surreptitiously laced, with double measures of spirits, an otherwise
innocuous drink of a friend when he knew the friend would shortly be driving
home. As a result, the friend was guilty of driving with an excess of
alcohol in his blood. The driver was guilty in that the driving offence is
one of strict liability — it doesn’t matter whether you did it on purpose,
or accidentally, just that you did it. It was held that the person accused
of lacing drinks in these circumstances was guilty as a secondary party
provided he knew that his friend was going to drive and also that the
alcohol surreptitiously given would bring his blood-alcohol concentration
above the prescribed limit. The Court pointed out that the “generous host”
who kept his guest' s glass topped up would not necessarily be guilty in the
same way since in that case the guest would be aware of the contents of his
glass and could make his own decision as to whether to drive.
R
v Blaue
July 17, 1975
In criminal law, can a wrongdoer defend himself by saying his victim’s fate
wouldn’t have been so bad if she had not had the unusual beliefs she did
have? This case answered that question. Robert Blaue stabbed the victim, who was
taken to hospital. The victim, a Jehovah's Witness, was informed that
without a blood transfusion she would probably die. She refused to accept a
transfusion as it would have been contrary to her religious beliefs. The
accused appealed against his conviction for manslaughter at Teesside crown
court on the grounds that the victim's refusal to accept a blood transfusion
broke the chain of causation. The court dismissed the appeal. Those who
inflict violence must take their victims as they find them. The victim's
refusal to accept treatment does not break the chain, even if it is an
unreasonable belief.
DPP
v Majewski
April 14, 1976
In this leading judgment, the House of Lords decided that a person who commits
a crime but doesn’t know what he’s doing because he is so inebriated can
still be convicted if it is not necessary to prove intention for that
particular crime. During the course of a disturbance at a pub in Basildon,
Essex, Robert Majewski attacked the landlord and two other people, injuring
all three of them. When the police arrived, he assaulted an officer, and
later, at the police station where he had been taken, he struck two other
officers. He was charged with various assaults. At his trial he testified
that during the 48 hours preceding the disturbance he had taken a
considerable quantity of drugs and that, at the time when the assaults were
committed, he was acting under a combination of amphetamines, barbiturates
and alcohol. He didn't know what he was doing and had no recollection of the
incidents in question. He was convicted and his appeal was dismissed. The
Lords held that unless the offence was one that required proof of a specific
intent, it was no defence to that the accused didn’t intend to commit the
act alleged. His recklessness was enough to convict him.
R
v Bundy
March 12, 1977
Clever arguments for defendants in criminal cases are sometimes confounded by
simple and even cleverer ones for the prosecution. This famous case provides
a good example of such a thrust, parry and counter thrust. When Dennis Bundy
was stopped by police in his car, he had with him some piping, a hammer, a
pipe threader and three pieces of stocking. He had been driving around
following a woman who was collecting the takings from vending machines in
London pubs with the apparent intention of robbing her. He was convicted of
“going equipped” for theft when “not at his place of abode”. Bundy appealed
on the grounds that, since he lived rough in his car, it was his abode. But
in dismissing the appeal, the court held that his car was his place of abode
only when after finding a site he had parked for the night, not when he was
in transit.
R
v Doukas
December 3, 1977
A major judgment on the charge of going equipped to cheat. Joseph Doukas, a
hotel wine waiter, had six bottles of his own wine in his coat pockets when
going to work. He intended, when a customer ordered wine, to serve one of
these bottles which he’d got very cheaply, to make out a separate bill and
keep the money that the hotel customer paid him. The scam was that while the
waiter would pocket the customer’s money, the hotel wouldn’t notice any loss
of income because none of its own bottles of wine were being taken to the
tables by the waiter. And the waiter would be making a profit because there
was a big difference between the cheap price of the wine he smuggled in to
the hotel and the expensive prices on the wine menu. An important question
for the appeal court was whether a charge of going equipped to cheat was
sustainable because a customer would not have been deceived if he paid for
wine and got wine. Doukas’s appeal was dismissed. It was held that customers
were deceived because it was reasonable to assume that they’d never have
handed over cash if they’d have known that the wine wasn’t the hotel’s but
rather that of the waiter’s personal stock being used in a swindle.
DPP
v Camplin
April 11, 1978
This was a leading and groundbreaking decision about the law of provocation.
Before this case, defendants on charges of murder could plead provocation
only by showing they had the power of self-restraint of an adult, even if
they were younger. Paul Camplin, a 15 year-old, hit a 50 year-old man over
the head with a chapatti pan and killed him. His defence was provocation. He
claimed that the deceased had forcibly had anal intercourse with him and
then laughed at him, whereupon Camplin had lost his self-control. The judge
at Leeds crown court directed the jury to consider whether the deceased’s
actions were enough to make a “reasonable man” do what Camplin did. If they
were, the killing could be reduced from murder to manslaughter. The judge
told the jury to consider not how a reasonable 15-year-old may have
responded, but how an adult man would have responded. That was unfair
because an adult man might be expected to show more restraint before using
lethal force. The jury convicted Camplin of murder. However, on appeal the
House of Lords held that the judge ought not to have instructed the jury to
disregard his age.
Jaggard
v Dickinson
July 26, 1980
