BEWLEY’S in Dublin is a good place to begin to understand European migration. The café was once a Dublin landmark, a cosy place staffed by red-faced and matronly tea ladies, serving office workers eating fry-ups, and under-employed students eking out their cups of coffee Its menu of comfort food and a decent brew finally gave up the ghost two years ago. After a brief closure and a public outcry, two leisure entrepreneurs relaunched it. The Dublin tea ladies have long gone, replaced by foreign voices, a redecorated interior with a restaurant upstairs and a lunchtime theatre to attract a smarter clientele.

Migration is transforming Ireland for the second time in a century — but this time with net immigration of 50,000 to 60,000 a year, a significant influx for the Irish Republic, with its population of four million. Less than a third are returnees, the reverse brain drain of Irish who emigrated to North America or Britain a decade or more ago. However, the new immigration is not just people with skills for the new financial and high-tech sectors, but people taking relatively menial jobs in the restaurant and hotel trades, which traditionally dipped into the deep well of domestic unskilled Irish labour.

Ireland is one of just three core European Union nations (the others being Britain and Sweden) that opened its doors to workers from the ten new member states when they joined in May 2004. This week, employment restrictions were removed in a further four states: Greece, Finland, Portugal and Spain. Still holding the fort against a tide of job-seeking migrants are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

Their position is hard to defend. Leaving aside the underlying inconsistency — of how you achieve closer union by barring entry — the core EU states are denying themselves an economic stimulus. By all accounts, Ireland, the UK and Sweden have benefited from Eastern European migration. Their economies are growing and unemployment rates are low. By contrast, the three largest blockaders (France, Germany and Italy) are struggling to expand their economies.

It may be unfair to compare these countries, because many have no recent experience of migration. Until the 1990s, Ireland was a substantial exporter of labour. Migration was a safety valve, a source of remittance income. By exporting its more entrepreneurial citizens, Ireland was able to let off the steam of potential political discontent and foist on other countries the expense of training young workers. In return, the US and the UK gained a supply of cheaper, highly motivated labour. It takes little imagination for Irish politicians to see Poland, Estonia and Slovakia mimicking the Irish experience.

French and Germans (and many British) travel badly. Abroad is generally perceived as worse and migration an act of desperation, born of failure, rather than pursuit of opportunity. Hence, migrants are perceived as less fit and driving down wages. During the 1970s and 1980s, Austria and Germany imported migrants, Gastarbeiter, to fill a shortage of unskilled manual labour.

Thus the solution, according to some, is to do the opposite: select only well-qualified migrants to staff areas of the economy in which there are labour shortages. In a recent study, Bruegel, a European economics think-tank, suggested that a high temporary minimum wage, say €30,000 (£20,600), be imposed on migrants from the new EU member states as an alternative to a blanket ban. That would protect the low-wage sectors in France and Germany while enabling those nations to take advantage of skilled migrants from the East.

This is a flawed and unfair compromise that fails to address the problem that employment protection in France and Germany may have priced some unskilled jobs too high and priced some workers out of jobs. Moreover, the real solution to the invasion from the East of an army of job-hungry poor is the creation of jobs in the East, exploiting the price advantage of that pool of cheaper labour where the jobs are needed most.

Instead, EU states carry on in their usual way, protecting and subsidising employment within the core EU states and erecting absurd barriers that prevent capital from meeting labour.

Poor will scrabble for crumbs if Doha fails

THE Doha Round of World Trade talks trundle along with shrill cries from the participants that time is running out. Looming is the expiration in July next year of the US President’s mandate from Congress to enter into trade agreements.

It’s worth asking what might happen if Doha does fail. The answer is: not a lot. Hence, the relative equanimity within the American camp, which senses increasing protectionism and xenophobia at home and little political advantage to be gained from being nice to importers. Within Europe, different views prevail, but a powerful bloc of protectionist European Union farming nations would not be displeased to see binned a negotiation predicated on freeing up trade in agriculture.

If Doha does die, trade talks would continue, but on a regional and bilateral basis, short-circuiting the WTO. This would be the preference of many in Washington. The United States has signed up numerous Central American states to cozy deals that give benefits to US importers and investors in return for access to the US market. The EU would also pursue the bilateral route, as was made clear by Kamal Nath, the Indian Trade Minister, and Peter Mandelson.

Washington and Brussels would carve up the world. Powerful emerging traders, such as India and Brazil, would do well. The lure of access to their huge markets would command in turn big tariff concessions from the US and EU. Smaller and poorer nations would squabble for crumbs.

carl.mortished@thetimes.co.uk

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